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Illinois v. Perkins
Incriminating Responses of an Accused to an Undercover Agent's
Questions are Admissible. Does This Undermine the Duty to Warn
of the Right to Remain Silent?
INTRODUCTION
In Illinois v. Perkins1 the United States Supreme Court held that
an undercover police officer need not give Miranda2 warnings before
questioning an incarcerated suspect. The Court found that the inter-
ests protected by Miranda are not implicated when a suspect does
not know the identity of his interrogator. This Note analyzes the
Court's reasoning in light of the concerns that motivated the Mi-
randa Court. Perkins reflects the Court's recent propensity to under-
mine the Miranda decision. Although Perkins is but one in a series
of cases in which the Court creates exceptions to the Miranda man-
date, it differs from the other decisions in important aspects. Perkins
shifts the focus of inquiry of a suspect's "voluntariness" away from
police activity to a suspect's subjective state of mind. For the first
time, the Court permitted deliberate police deception in obtaining an
unwarned confession from an incarcerated suspect. In doing so, the
Supreme Court in Perkins created an exception which blurs the
bright-line rule provided by Miranda. Because the reasoning in the
Perkins opinion inadequately addresses the concerns that motivated
the Miranda decision, the Court opens the door to abuse of fifth
amendment protections against self-incrimination. The extent of the
abuse may now only be limited by the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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On November 8, 1984, Richard Stephenson was shot and killed in
Fairview Heights, Illinois.3 The homicide remained unsolved until
March 1986, when Donald Charlton informed police that he had
learned about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham Cor-
rectional Facility where he was serving a six-year prison sentence for
burglary.4 The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins.' According to
Charlton, Perkins told him details of a murder he had committed in
East St. Louis.6 Because he believed that "[p]eople should not kill
people,"'7 Charlton cooperated with the police without receiving any
compensation.8 The facts Charlton related revealed details of the
Stephenson murder that were not widely known.9 Because the police
believed that only the perpetrator would know the facts of the mur-
der in the detail that Charlton related, they treated the story as a
credible one.10
By the time Charlton came forward with his story, Lloyd Perkins
had been released from Graham and was being held in Montgomery
County Jail awaiting trial on an aggravated battery charge, unre-
lated to the Stephenson murder.11 The police wanted to investigate
Perkins' possible connection with the Stephenson murder but decided
that placement of an eavesdropping device in Perkins' cell would be
impractical.12
The police decided to elicit information from Perkins by placing
an undercover agent, posing as an escaped convict, in Perkins' cellb-
lock. The plan was for Charlton and an undercover agent named
Parisi to pose as escapees from a work release program who were




7. People v. Perkins, 176 111. App. 3d 443, 444, 531 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1988),
rev'd sub. nom Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
8. Id.
9. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Accordingly, the
fourth amendment is not violated when prison officials randomly search a prison cell. Id.
It follows that no fourth amendment violation occurs when officials place an eavesdrop-
ping device in a prisoner's cell.
However, when an informant is placed in an inmate's prison cell to elicit incriminating
testimony, other constitutional issues are raised. In a sixth amendment context, (after an
inmate's sixth amendment right to counsel has attached) admissibility depends on
whether the informant "actively" (inadmissible) or "passively" (admissible) questioned
the inmate. See Note, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: "Passive" and "Active" Government Infor-
mants - A Problematic Test, 72 IowA L. REv. 1423 (1987). The author of this note
addresses the Court's most recent decision regarding the admissibility of statements ob-
tained when informants actively question an inmate before a sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches or a fifth amendment right to counsel is invoked. See infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
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arrested in the course of a burglary. Both Parisi and Charlton were
instructed to refrain from questioning Perkins directly about the
murder but to report anything he said concerning it. 13 Parisi, assum-
ing the alias of "Vito Bianco" and wearing jail garb, was placed in
Perkins' cellblock together with Charlton. 4
Charlton spoke with Perkins briefly and introduced Parisi by his
alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more time"
and suggested that the three men escape.' 5 The trio met in Perkins'
cell later that evening, after the other inmates were asleep, to refine
their escape plan. Parisi initiated Perkins' narration of the crime by
asking him if he had ever "done" anybody. Perkins replied that he
had, and he proceeded to describe the events of the Stephenson
murder.'6
13. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2394. Only when an inmate has a constitutionally recog-
nized right to counsel will the Court proscribe informants from directly and actively
questioning an inmate. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (to suppress incrimi-
nating statements, defendant must show that the police took some action, beyond mere
listening, that was designed to deliberately elicit an incriminating response). Here, the
instruction not to question Perkins directly was unnecessary because his sixth amendment
right to counsel had not yet attached.
In addition, Perkins had not invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel; he was
never given Miranda warnings. Had Perkins invoked his fifth amendment right to coun-
sel, the inquiry would focus on whether he subsequently waived that right. See infra note
58 and accompanying text.
The Court is reluctant to find waiver once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (when a suspect invokes his or her right to
counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is made available, unless the suspect initi-
ates further communication). Recently the Court reaffirmed the Edwards rule in Min-
nick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990). (Any questioning of the accused subsequent to
an invocation of right to counsel requires the presence of counsel despite previous meet-
ings between the accused and counsel). For an analysis of waiver and invocation of the
right to counsel, see Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REv. 975 (1986).
14. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
15. Id.
16. Id. As Justice Marshall discusses in his dissent, Parisi questioned Perkins for
thirty-five minutes. Id. at 2401. Parisi's testimony at Perkins' murder trial reveals the
nature of the inquiry:
[Agent:] "You ever do anyone?"
[Perkins:] "Yeah, once in East St. Louis, in a rich white neighborhood."
Informant: "I didn't know they had any rich white neighborhoods in East St.
Louis."
Perkins: "It wasn't in East St. Louis, it was by a race track in Fairview
Heights. .. ."
[Agent]: "You did a guy in Fairview Heights?"
Perkins: "Yeah in a rich white section where most of the houses look the
same."
[Informant]: "If all the houses look the same, how did you know you had the
right house?"
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Perkins was arrested and charged with the Stephenson murder the
following morning."i Subsequent to his arrest, Perkins was advised of
his constitutional rights,18 pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 9 and
Perkins requested an attorney.20 Parisi did not give Perkins Miranda
warnings because it would have defeated the purpose of the ruse.
Before trial, Perkins moved to suppress the statements made to
Parisi in jail.2 ' The trial court granted the motion to suppress the
statements because Parisi and Charlton, as agents of the State, did
not give Perkins Miranda warnings before conducting a custodial in-
terrogation.2" On appeal, the State contended that Miranda warn-
ings were not required because Parisi and Charlton did not coerce
Perkins to incriminate himself.
2
The State argued that Perkins made his statements voluntarily
and without the compulsion inherent in a "police-dominated" atmo-
sphere because Perkins believed Parisi was a "biker" rather than an
undercover agent.24 The State contended that Miranda was applica-
ble only in situations when an authority figure directly interrogates
an accused. The Appellate Court of Illinois rejected those conten-
tions and affirmed the trial court's suppression of Perkins'
statements.25
Perkins: "Me and two guys cased the house for about a week. I knew exactly
which house, the second house on the left from the corner."
[Agent]: "How long ago did this happen?"
Perkins: "Approximately about two years ago. I got paid $5,000 for that job."
[Agent]: "How did it go down?"
Perldns: "I walked up to . . . this guy['s] house with a sawed-off under my
trench coat."
[Agent]: "What type gun[?]"
Perkins: "A .12 gauge Remmington [sic] Automatic Model 1100 sawed-off."
Id. at 2401-02. Parisi continued his inquiry, asking a series of questions designed to elicit
specific information about the victim, the crime scene, the weapon, Perkins' motive, and
his actions during and after the shooting. Id. at 2402.
17. People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App.3d 443, 446, 531 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1988), rev'd
sub. nom Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
18. Id.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
may not use an exculpatory or inculpatory statement arising from custodial interrogation
of a defendant unless the prosecutor can demonstrate the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the defendant's privilege against self incrimination. Id. at 444. Ac-
cordingly, Miranda requires that police inform suspects that they have a right to remain
silent; that any statement they make can and will be used in court as evidence against
them; that they have a right to consult with an attorney before and during any interroga-
tion; and that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent them.
Id. at 467-73.




24. Id. at 447, 531 N.E.2d at 144.
25. Id. at 450, 531 N.E.2d at 145-46. Because no Illinois cases directly addressed
the issue of whether an undercover agent's interrogation of a defendant required that
Miranda warnings be given, the court looked to other jurisdictions. The court found that
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The appellate court found that Miranda warnings were essential
in overcoming the pressures of interrogation and in ascertaining the
truth.26 The court found warnings to be required to ensure that de-
fendants know that they are free to exercise their fifth amendment
27
right against self-incrimination.
The defendant's fifth amendment constitutional privilege is ful-
filled only when an agent of the prosecution warns the defendant
prior to custodial interrogation. Because the police may not "do indi-
rectly what they may not do directly," 28 the court would not "permit
the police to subvert the defendant's fifth-amendment right against
self-incrimination by questioning the defendant, through informants
and while he was in custody, without first warning him of his rights
pursuant to Miranda."29 Accordingly, the court found that the fail-
ure to warn Perkins pursuant to Miranda rendered his statements
inadmissible.30 After the Illinois Supreme Court denied certiorari, 31
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 to decide
whether an undercover law enforcement officer must give Miranda
warnings prior to questioning an incarcerated suspect.
other jurisdictions had applied the requirements of Miranda in cases involving an inform-
ant's custodial interrogation of a defendant. Id. at 449, 531 N.E.2d at 144. See, e.g.,
Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985) (prosecution's failure to give a
defendant Miranda warnings rendered an informant's surreptitious custodial questioning
inadmissible); and State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 278 N.W.2d 756 (1979) (incriminating
statements made to defendant's cellmate were inadmissible because Miranda warnings
were required when the cellmate acted as an agent of the police in conducting custodial
interrogations).
The Perkins court discussed a Rhode Island case, State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360
A.2d 548 (1976), which involved facts similar to those surrounding Perkins' interroga-
tion. In Travis, the police placed an undercover officer with long hair and a beard in a
cell with the defendant. The defendant allegedly made several incriminating statements
about a robbery to the officer. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress,
but on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction by
holding that "the ruse employed by the police violated the defendant's rights under the
fifth amendment of the constitution." Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 531 N.E.2d at
145 (1988) (citing State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 682, 360 A.2d 548, 551 (1976)).
26. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 450, 531 N.E. 2d at 145.
27. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that "[n]o
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The Appellate Court of Illinois found that the defendant's fifth
amendment rights are ensured only when the defendant is "guaranteed the right to re-
main silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Per-
kins, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 451, 531 N.E.2d at 146 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 460 (1966)).
28. Id. at 450, 531 N.E.2d at 145.
29. Id. at 452, 531 N.E.2d at 146.
30. Id.
31. People v. Perkins, 125 Il1. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989).
32. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
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THE SUPREME COURT REVERSAL
In Illinois v. Perkins,33 the Court reversed the appellate court's
decision. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court held that an under-
cover officer posing as an inmate need not give Miranda warnings to
an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an
incriminating response.34 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
found that the interests protected by Miranda were not implicated
when Parisi questioned Perkins in his jail cell. 35 Although "[flidelity
to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced
strictly,"3 the warnings need only be given in situations in which the
underlying concerns of Miranda are implicated.
7
According to the Court, Miranda was concerned with a police-
dominated atmosphere that generated "inherently compelling pres-
sures which work to undermine the [defendant's] will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."38
Miranda forbids police coercion, but it does not prevent "strategic
deception."3 9 Consequently, the Court held that "[p]loys to mislead
a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to
the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Mi-
randa's concerns."40 Because "[cioercion is determined from the per-
spective of the suspect,"'4 1 the Court found that the essential ingredi-
ents of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are lacking
when an incarcerated suspect speaks freely to someone he believes is
a fellow inmate.42 The Court held that Perkins' statements were vol-
untarily made and admissible because he was not coerced.43
The Court rejected Perkins' argument that Miranda warnings are
required whenever a suspect is in custody "in a technical sense and
converses with someone who happens to be a government agent. '44
33. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
34. Id. at 2399.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2397 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (holding
that "custody", requiring Miranda warnings prior to questioning, occurs whenever a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's position would believe they were not free to leave)). In
Berkemer, the Court refused to hold that a motorist was in custody, for Miranda pur-
poses, whenever he was stopped and required to vacate his car. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
440. Although a traffic stop is a "seizure" with fourth amendment implications, the
Court held that it does not exert sufficient pressure on a defendant "to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights." Id. at 437.
37. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
38. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); Berkemer v. Mc-
Carty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2399.
44. Id. at 2397.
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Unless the suspect has reason to believe that his interrogators have
power over him, interrogation and custody do not interact to create a
"police dominated" atmosphere. Therefore, Miranda warnings are
not necessary.45
The Court compared the police tactics used here to those used in
Hoffa v. United States.46 In that case the Court approved the admis-
sion of a defendant's incriminating statements made to an under-
cover informant.47 The Court noted that the only difference between
the defendant in Hoffa and Perkins was that Perkins was incarcer-
ated.48 The Court held that incarceration does not "warrant a pre-
sumption that the use of an undercover agent ... makes any confes-
sion thus obtained involuntary. '49 The Court suggested that "[t]he
bare fact of custody may not in every instance require a warning
even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official
"50
The Court also held that their prior sixth amendment decisions
51
were inapplicable here.52 The sixth amendment prevents the govern-
ment from interfering with the accused's right to counsel after the
initiation of formal charges. "[T]he government may not use an un-
dercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
once a suspect is charged with [a] crime."53 The Court found that
because Perkins had not yet been charged with the Stephenson mur-
45. Id.
46. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). While Hoffa was on trial, he often met with an associate
who, unbeknownst to Hoffa, was cooperating with the police. The associate told the po-
lice that Hoffa had divulged his attempts to bribe jury members. The Supreme Court
held that these statements were admissible at Hoffa's subsequent trial for jury tampering
because Hoffa's statements had not been coerced. Id. at 304.
47. Id.
48. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Court leaves the question for another day, but suggests that it may be
willing to forego Miranda warnings even when an inmate knows the identity of the inter-
rogator. The answer may depend on whether the inmate was actually coerced, rather
than on police conduct. The Miranda Court attempted to avoid this difficult inquiry. See
infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
51. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[fin all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Court has ruled that the govern-
ment may not use an undercover agent to circumvent the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel once a suspect has been formally charged with a crime. United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980). Once the suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, the po-
lice may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the suspect in the absence
of counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
52. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
53. Id. at 2398-99 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
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der, his sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached. There-
fore, the sixth amendment precedent was held to be inapplicable.5
Also unavailing was Perkins' argument that a bright-line rule was
desirable and mandated by Miranda. The Court found that the in-
terests protected by Miranda were not implicated. The Court con-
cluded that law enforcement officers would have little difficulty ap-
plying the holding that "an undercover law enforcement officer
posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an
incarcerated suspect before" questioning the suspect.55
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRING OPINION 56
Although Justice Brennan did not agree with the majority's char-
acterization of Miranda in its entirety, he agreed that the interests
protected by the Miranda decision are not implicated when "a sus-
pect does not know that his questioner is a police agent . . .
Because the only issue raised at this stage of the litigation was the
applicability of Miranda, Justice Brennan concurred in the
judgment.
5 8
However, Justice Brennan intimated that the lower court, on re-
mand, might properly find that Perkins' confession violated the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 He indicated that he
did not "believe the Constitution condones the method by which the
police extracted the confession" from Perkins.60 To the contrary,
Justice Brennan thought that "the deception and manipulation prac-
ticed on respondent raise a substantial claim that the confession was
obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause."'1
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2399.
56. Id. at 2399-2401 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. In a footnote, Justice Brennan distinguishes this case from those involving a
suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. n.1. Justice Brennan states that if Perkins
"had been formally charged on the unrelated charge and had invoked his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, he may have a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admissibility of
these statements." Id. Also, had Perkins "invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
or right to silence ... the inquiry would focus on whether he subsequently waived the
particular right." Id. The waiver of Miranda rights must be "'voluntary in the sense that
it [must be] the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion
or deception."' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986)).
59. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399-401. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution denies the States the power to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I. The fifth
amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination was incorporated through
the fourteenth amendment and held to be binding upon the states in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
60. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
61. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Brennan's concurrence and the narrow focus of
the majority on Miranda itself suggest that a finding by the trial court that the police
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Justice Brennan reminded the majority that due process requires
techniques "compatible 'with a system that presumes innocence and
assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means'. ... 2 According to Justice Brennan, society has long held
the view that the "police must obey the law while enforcing the law"
and that "in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves. 63 Relying on the Court's
opinion in United States v. Henry, Justice Brennan noted that the
"mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused" making
him "particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government
agents. 64 Because of these inherent pressures, the methods used to
elicit confessions in a custodial environment must survive close
scrutiny. 5
violated due process in extracting the confession would not be reversed by the Supreme
Court on appeal. Justice Brennan states that "[it is open to the lower court on remand
to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, respondent's confession
was elicited in a manner that violated the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2400-01. No other
justice joined Justice Brennan's opinion. However, his views may have been instrumental
in forming the majority in favor of remanding the case on Due Process grounds. The
impact that Justice Brennan's recent resignation will have on the Court's conduct in
similar cases remains unclear. In Arizona v. Fullminante, 59 U.S.L.W. 4235, 4235 (U.S.
March 6, 1991), five justices held that a harmless-error analysis applies in appellate
cases where a coerced confession is admitted as evidence at trial. In light of Justice
Brennan's concern for the integrity of a criminal justice system which presumes the inno-
cence of a criminal defendant, it is unlikely that he would have agreed with the majority
in Fulminante that coerced confessions are mere "trial errors" and thus subject to harm-
less error analysis.
62. Id. at 2400 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)).
63. Id. (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321 (1959)). In Spano, a
majority of the Court found a confession obtained after an overnight, eight-hour ques-
tioning session to be inadmissible because it was involuntarily given. Spano at 320, 323.
In determining whether a confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances,
the Court recognized several factors, including but not limited to the subject's age and
experience, physical and mental state, police use of trickery or deception to obtain the
confession, and the amount of time a defendant is subjected to interrogation. Id. at 321-
23. The inquiry is whether the defendant's will was overborne by the police. If so, the
ensuing confession is inadmissible. Id. at 321.
64. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2400 (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
274 (1980)). Because of the pressures inherent to custody, Justice Brennan maintained
that the state "is in a unique position to exploit" the suspect's vulnerability. Id. "[T]he
State can ensure that a suspect is barraged with questions from an undercover agent
until the suspect confesses." Id. Justice Brennan stated that "testimony in this case sug-
gests the State did just that." Id.
65. Id. Justice Brennan expressed his reservations about the method used to elicit
the confession in this case:
The police devised a ruse to lure respondent into incriminating himself when
he was in jail on an unrelated charge. A police agent, posing as a fellow inmate
and proposing a sham escape plot, tricked respondent into confessing that he
1027
JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT 6
Justice Marshall considered this to be a fairly straightforward
case. "Because Perkins was interrogated by police while he was in
custody, Miranda required that the officer inform him of his
rights."'6 7 If a suspect is in custody when interrogated, Miranda re-
quires that the prosecution comply with "'procedural safeguards ef-
fective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.' "08 Here,
Perkins was in custody when he was interrogated by an agent of the
police. Accordingly, Perkins' confession should have been suppressed
because he "received -no Miranda warnings before he was subjected
to custodial interrogation .... "69
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's Miranda rule exception
which applies whenever a suspect does not know the interrogator's
identity. He believed the majority's exception was inconsistent with
the Miranda rationale.7 0 He disagreed with the majority's assertion
that conversations between undercover agents and suspects are de-
void of the coercion inherent in station-house interrogations. Justice
Marshall interpreted Miranda and its progeny as requiring warnings
to be given whenever "a law enforcement agent structures a custo-
dial interrogation so that a suspect feels compelled to reveal incrimi-
nating information ... .
He observed that inmates are more susceptible to police trickery
due to psychological pressures inherent to incarceration 72 which
had once committed a murder, as a way of proving that he would be willing to
do so again should the need arise during the escape. The testimony of the un-
dercover officer and police informant at the suppression hearing reveal the de-
liberate manner in which the two elicited incriminating statements from
respondent.
Id.
66. Id. at 2401-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2402.
68. Id. at 2401 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2402.
72. Id. at 2403. Justice Marshall cited Miranda to support his contention that it
was concerned with the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation. The Miranda court
noted:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently com-
pelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcom-
ing the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (emphasis added). This language was
quoted in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981) (requirement of the Miranda warn-
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make the suspect likely to talk with fellow inmates. Miranda prohib-
its the police from deceptively taking advantage of an inmate's psy-
chological vulnerability by exploiting those pressures. As the Court
observed in a sixth amendment context, the mere fact of custody
may bring subtle influences to bear that make an inmate susceptible
to the ploys of undercover agents.73 In addition, when a suspect is in
custody, the constant threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison
environment may make the suspect demonstrate "his toughness to
other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent acts. ' 4 The
unique pressures inherent to incarceration are not eliminated by the
suspect's ignorance of the interrogator's true identity.7 5 Therefore,
the Court "need not inquire past the bare facts of custody and inter-
rogation to determine whether Miranda warnings are required. 76
According to Justice Marshall, Miranda was not "concerned solely
with police coercion."7 Rather, Miranda was concerned with any
police tactics that may operate to compel a suspect in custody to
make incriminating statements. The compulsion "proscribed by Mi-
randa includes deception by the police."17 8 Among other things, the
Miranda Court was concerned with confessions obtained through po-
lice trickery. The Miranda Court noted that "interrogators some-
times are instructed to induce a confession out of trickery. 7 9 Justice
Marshall cited other decisions which indicate that Miranda warnings
were meant to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing.80 Although police deception has been al-
lowed to obtain incriminating statements, as in Hoffa v. United
States,"' the defendant in that case was not in custody, and Mi-
ings is to combat what the Court saw as inherently compelling pressures of custodial
interrogation).





77. Id. at 2402 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453 (1966).
80. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2402 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433
(1984)). See supra note 34. Justice Marshall also cited other decisions for the proposi-
tion that Miranda was meant to prevent police from using trickery to obtain a confession:
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary in
the sense that it is free of intimidation, coercion or deception); and Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (a defendant's Constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is seriously imposed upon if the defendant does not know that he or she is under
interrogation by a government agent).
81. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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randa's concerns were not implicated. 2
Finally, Justice Marshall rejected the Court's adoption of an ex-
ception to Miranda because it violates the "bright-line" approach
the Court had desired in Miranda.83 The outer boundaries of the
exception created by the majority might be unclear in cases with
fact patterns different than the facts in this case.
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by offering some disturbing
hypothetical questions. He wondered if Miranda would be violated if
an undercover agent beat a confession out of a suspect, or if an un-
dercover agent obtained incriminating statements from the suspect
while posing as the suspect's defense attorney or priest.8 4 Although
such tricks may deceive a suspect into confiding in one believed to be
a trusted adviser, they may be permitted by the majority's exception.
Justice Marshall rejected the "adoption of a substantial loophole in
our jurisprudence protecting suspects' Fifth Amendment rights."8"
THE MIRANDA CONCERNS
The majority claims that Miranda is not implicated when an in-
mate talks with an undercover agent in a cell because there is no
coercion in such a case. 86 Justice Brennan agreed that the interests
protected by Miranda were not implicated in this case, but he sug-
gested the police may have violated Perkins' fourteenth amendment
due process rights.8 7 Justice Marshall wrote that because of the pres-
sures inherent in incarceration, Miranda warnings are required
whenever a suspect is interrogated while in custody.88
As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, the Court has long
recognized that there are psychological pressures inherent in incar-
ceration.8 9 These pressures helped motivate the Miranda Court:
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before,..
82. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2402. Here, of course, Perkins was interrogated while in
custody.
83. Id. at 2403-04. One reason Miranda was decided was "to give concrete consti-
tutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966). Justice Marshall cited subsequent Supreme Court
decisions reiterating this goal. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (Mi-
randa has the virtue of informing the police with specificity as to what they may do in
conducting custodial interrogation).
84. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2404. This conduct would most likely be prohibited by
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text. Impersonating the defendant's attorney would also be prohibited as an in-
terference with the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, had the right attached.
See supra notes 12, 13, 51, & 58 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2396-99. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 2399-401. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 2401-03. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 2403. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical,
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitu-
tional inquisition.
[ T]he very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on indi-
vidual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.
of . As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to 'guard against
intimidation or trickery.90
The Miranda Court was concerned with the pressures inherent in
custodial interrogation. To offset these pressures, Miranda required
that a suspect be warned of his constitutional rights prior to being
asked questions likely to elicit an incriminating response.9 1 Whether
a suspect is coerced directly by police under a bright light or indi-
rectly by police trickery in a "police-dominated" atmosphere, Mi-
randa prohibits the police from questioning without first warning the
suspect.
Miranda was also concerned with "the esteem in which the ad-
ministration of justice is held by the public."9 Justice Brennan al-
luded to this concern in his concurrence when he wrote that "the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law . . . ."9 In address-
ing these concerns, the Miranda Court quoted Justice Brandeis:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution.9
Justice Kennedy and the majority of the Perkins Court gave little
notice to these concerns by holding that police misconduct is permis-
sible as long as it "does not rise to the level of compulsion or coer-
cion .... -95
There were other concerns underlying the Miranda decision. The
Court was concerned with "the dangers of false confessions" and the
tendency that coerced confessions made "the police and prosecutors
90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448, 455, 461 (1966).
91. Id. at 444. Also, see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 448.
93. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2400 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320
(1959)). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
94. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
95. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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less zealous in the search for objective evidence." 908 All of the policies
discussed by the Miranda Court were thought to point to one over-
riding concern: the concern that the constitutional foundation under-
lying the privilege against self incrimination is the respect a govern-
ment "must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 97 The
warnings were created to help maintain a "fair state-individual bal-
ance."98 The warnings were also created to ensure that the govern-
ment would bear their entire burden of proof. In order to "respect
the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth."
9
The Perkins majority addressed only one concern underlying the
Miranda decision: direct police coercion. 100 However, in addition to
this concern, Miranda addressed several other concerns: psychologi-
cal pressures inherent in incarceration, indirect police coercion, fair-
ness, the dangers of false confessions and police misconduct, burden
of proof, maintenance of the proper state-individual balance, and ad-
herence to an accusatory rather than inquisitional criminal justice
system. By focusing solely on direct police coercion, the Perkins ma-
jority created an exception that fails to address many of the concerns
that motivated the Miranda decision.
The Court in Miranda also attempted "to give concrete constitu-
tional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to fol-
low." 101 One of the virtues of the Miranda decision was to provide
the police with a "bright-line"102 approach in conducting custodial
interrogations. As was pointed out by Justice Marshall, in creating
an exception to the Miranda rule, the majority has muddied the con-
stitutional waters.1 03 The Miranda Court did not require, as the Per-
kins majority does, a court to inquire into the mental state of a sus-
pect to determine whether he was coerced into confessing. It simply
held that the "prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming
96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447.
97. Id. at 460.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-38 (1940)).
100. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
101. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42. Also, see supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
102. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (the whole point of the Court's
work in this area has been to prescribe "bright line" rules to give clear guidance to the
authorities). See also Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Counter-
trends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 405, 413-14, 462 (1982) (noting that Miranda intended to
replace existing voluntariness tests with a bright line standard).
103. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2403-04. See supra notes 83-85.
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from custodial interrogation" 10 4 unless suspects are first informed of
their Constitutional rights. The Miranda Court did not qualify this
requirement to permit the exception created by the Perkins majority.
Although Perkins may not have been directly coerced in a "police-
dominated" atmosphere, he was in custody'01 when interrogated 6
by the police. In such a situation, Miranda requires that suspects be
informed of their Constitutional rights prior to police questioning. 0 7
The exception created by the Perkins majority is at odds with this
strict mandate and diffuses the bright-line rule intended by the Mi-
randa Court.
DISMANTLING MIRANDA
Although the exception created by the Court in Perkins does not
overrule Miranda, it reflects the Court's recent propensity to under-
mine the Miranda decision. 08 Miranda was a five-to-four decision.
It only took a slight shift in the Court's majority to produce deci-
sions which have chipped away at various aspects of Miranda. To
104. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
105. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren wrote that "[b]y custodial interrogation,
we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or othervise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
The Court has defined custody as "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement'
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (quoting in part Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). In
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the court introduced a "reasonable suspect"
test holding that custody occurs whenever a reasonable person in the suspect's position
would believe they were not free to leave. Id. at 442. See supra note 36.
106. The Court has held that interrogation includes "express questioning" or its
"functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Interroga-
tion has been defined as "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301. Although it is not
dispositive, police intent is a factor which the courts consider in deciding whether the
defendant was interrogated. The courts will consider whether the police knew, or should
have known, that the suspect was likely to incriminate himself or herself as a result of
their conduct. Id. at 301-02.
107. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
108. See Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1989). Professor Benner writes
that "although the Court would not overrule the decision because of the sensitivity to the
political overtones of a direct attack" the Rehnquist Court has nevertheless gradually
dismantled Miranda "of its carefully crafted methodology .... " Id. at 121. Under the
new doctrine developed by the Rehnquist Court, a confession is "voluntary" if and only if
the police did not coerce the defendant. Id. at 126. Professor Benner concludes that the
premise that the absence of coercive police conduct is synonymous with due process "ig-
nores history, is contrary to precedent, and cannot be justified by the deterrence rationale
upon which it is founded." Id.
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appreciate its importance, Perkins should be considered in light of
these recent Supreme Court decisions.
In New York v. Quarles, °9 the Court created a "public-safety" or
"emergency" exception to the Miranda rule. In an opinion written
by Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that "the need for an-
swers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety
outweighs the need for""' Miranda warnings. Therefore, a police
officer may forgo giving Miranda warnings in circumstances where
the dangers to the police or to the public outweigh the suspect's fifth
amendment right to remain silent.'
In Oregon v. Elstad,"2 the Court held that a confession made sub-
sequent to an unwarned statement was admissible. The Court said
that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which is broadly ap-
plied to fourth amendment violations, must be more narrowly ap-
plied to Miranda violations. Because Miranda "sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself,"" 3 the Court held that absent de-
liberate coercion or improper tactics in obtaining an unwarned state-
ment, the "technical" violation of Miranda did not render the con-
fession involuntary. Although the suspect may have thought the "cat
was out of the bag" after making the first unwarned (and inadmissi-
ble) statement, rendering subsequent warnings meaningless, the
Court held that the subsequent Miranda warnings cured the defect.
In Moran v. Burbine,"4 the Court declined to read Miranda as
109. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Quarles was approached by a police officer in a grocery
store. Upon seeing the officer, Quarles turned and ran toward the rear of the store, where
he was caught. A frisk revealed that Quarles was wearing an empty shoulder holster.
After handcuffing him, the officer asked Quarles where the gun was. Quarles had not
been given Miranda warnings. He answered "the gun is over there," nodding in the di-
rection of some empty cartons. Id. at 652. The Court held that the gun and the state-
ment revealing its location need not be suppressed. Id. at 659. It reached the same con-
clusion as to subsequent statements declared to be fruits of the Miranda violation. Id. at
660.
110. Id. at 657.
111. Id. This begs the question regarding the scope of the exception. Under what
circumstances do the dangers involved outweigh the suspect's constitutional rights? May
the police keep a suspect indefinitely without giving Miranda warnings if they claim to
be seeking information to protect the public? The Court has not indicated the scope of
the emergency exception, and has further "lessen(ed] the desirable clarity of (the Mi-
randa] rule." Id. at 658.
112. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The police suspected Elstad, an eighteen-year-old, for
burglary. They obtained an arrest warrant and served it at his home. Prior to warning
Elstad pursuant to Miranda, the arresting officer began talking to Elstad about the bur-
glary. When the officer indicated that he thought Elstad was involved in the burglary,
Elstad replied "Yes, I was there." Id. at 301. Later at the police station, after giving him
Miranda warnings, the police obtained a full written confession from Elstad. Id.
Elstad's lawyers argued that the subsequent confession introduced at trial was the
product of the unwarned statement and was thus inadmissible as "the fruit of the poison-
ous tree." Id. at 302. The Court rejected this argument and held that Elstad's written
confession was admissible. Id. at 318.
113. Id. at 306.
114. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Brian Burbine was in custody as a murder suspect
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forbidding police deception of a suspect's attorney." 5 The Court rea-
soned that the "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the sus-
pect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the
capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a Constitutional
right."" 6 Miranda did not require that the police inform a suspect of
an attorney's efforts to contact him. The Court held that, despite the
police deception, the suspect had made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his Constitutional right to remain silent. As it did in El-
stad, the Court stressed that Miranda warnings are not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution. Rather, they are "procedural
safeguards" created to protect the fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination. Failure to give Miranda warnings is a
"technical violation" which differs in significant respects from a vio-
lation of the fifth amendment .1
In Colorado v. Connelly, 8 written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Court renovated the due process "voluntariness" test for deter-
mining the validity of confessions." 9 The Court held that a psychotic
defendant could voluntarily waive his Miranda rights despite suffer-
ing from "command hallucinations" which interferred with his abil-
ity to make free and rational choices.' 20 The defendant was com-
pelled by "voices in his head" to confess to the murder of a young
girl. The Court focused on police conduct and found that, absent
police coercion, the defendant had voluntarily waived his rights. The
Court held that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to
the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.''2
PERKINS: A NEW APPROACH
Perkins represents the Supreme Court's most recent approach in
applying the Miranda doctrine. Although it creates yet another ex-
based on the statements of co-defendants. An attorney contacted by Burbine's sister
called the police station and received assurances that Burbine would not be questioned
until the next day. Burbine was never told an attorney had called. However, he was
informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda. The interrogation, commenced less than an
hour after the attorney's telephone call, resulted in a confession. Id. at 417-18.
115. Id. at 424.
116. Id. at 422.
117. See Broome, You (Might) Have a Right to Remain Silent, 7 CAL. LAW. 37,
39 (1987) (discussing the Burbine and Elstad decisions).
118. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
119. See supra note 108.
120. 479 U.S. at 170-71.
121. Id. at 167.
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ception to the Miranda mandate, it differs from the other decisions
undermining Miranda. For example, in Connelly, the Court focused
on police activity.'22 Absent police coercion, the Court found the
statements were voluntarily made, despite clear evidence that the
statements were a product of internal forces beyond the suspect's
control. Conversely, the Perkins majority focused on the suspect's
beliefs. 23 The majority wrote that "where a suspect does not know
that he is conversing with a government agent"'1 4 coercion will not
be presumed despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The Court
has conveniently shifted its focus from police conduct to the suspect's
state of mind.
Perkins is distinguishable from the Burbine and Elstad decisions.
In Burbine, the Court emphasized that although they found the po-
lice deception of Burbine's attorney distasteful,' 25 Burbine was not
prevented from voluntarily waiving his rights. The deception in
Burbine was practiced indirectly on the defendant by deceiving his
attorney. However, in Perkins, the police deception was practiced di-
rectly on the defendant. Elstad did not involve police deception. 26
Although he had not been given his Miranda warnings, Elstad knew
he was talking to a police officer who was investigating a burglary.'
127
In contrast, Perkins did not know he was speaking with a police of-
ficer who was investigating a murder. In addition, Perkins was in jail
when he made his "confession." When Elstad made his original in-
culpatory statements, he was in his house.
Perkins is also distinguishable from New York v. Quarles. 28 The
Court in Quarles was concerned with emergency situations. Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the "overriding considerations of public safety
justify the officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings .... ,,129
Perkins' interrogation was not necessitated by an emergency. Rather,
it was the product of careful planning. Also, Quarles' "interroga-
tion" was conducted in a public place and consisted of one ques-
tion.130 While Perkins was incarcerated, he was questioned about a
serious crime for thirty-five minutes.' 3'
Perkins represents a further departure from the Miranda ration-
ale. It purports to create a narrowly defined exception applicable
122. Id. at 167, 170-71.
123. See supra notes 42, 45 and accompanying text.
124. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
125. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986). See supra notes 110-12 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra note 112.
127. Id.
128. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See supra note 109.
129. Id. at 651. ,
130. See supra note 109.
131. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2401 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 16.
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only to cases with similar facts. 132 However, in creating this excep-
tion, it shifts the focus of the "voluntariness" inquiry away from po-
lice activity to the suspect's state of mind. 133 Although police decep-
tion has been tolerated in the past, 34 the Court has never permitted
deliberate police deception of an inmate in obtaining an unwarned
confession. The Court has opened the door for the use of incommuni-
cado interrogation as a legitimate investigative tactic. For the first
time, the Court encourages the use of police deception in the custo-
dial interrogation context. 13
5
In a parenthetical, the Court indicates its willingness to further
undermine the Miranda doctrine. The Court said that even when a
suspect "is aware that he is speaking to an official,"' 36 custody may
not in every instance require Miranda warnings. 37 Perhaps the
Court has lost sight of its role as the protector of Constitutional
rights as Justice Brennan accused it of doing in his dissent from the
granting of certiorari in Colorado v. Connelly:
[t]he Court goes beyond the mere philosophic inclination to facilitate crimi-
132. Id. at 2399. The Court said that "[flaw enforcement officers will have little
difficulty putting into practice our holding that undercover agents need not give Miranda
warnings to incarcerated suspects." Id.
133. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (permitting police decep-
tion of the suspect's attorney); see supra notes 114-16, 125 and accompanying text; see
also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (permitting police deception of a sus-
pect while the suspect was released on bail); see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying
text.
135. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The Court wrote that "Mi-
randa was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in
front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates." Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.
Because Perkins did not know the true identity of his cellmates "[h]e spoke at his own
peril." Id.
136. Id.
137. The Court recently had the opportunity to address this issue but decided not
to do so when it denied certiorari in Lockhart v. Hill, 110 S. Ct. 3258 (1990) (mem).
Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated his belief "that Miranda and its progeny ha[d] al-
ready answered" the question of whether custody mandated that an inmate be given
warnings prior to interrogation. Id. at 3259 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Al-
though the defendant, an inmate, was not given Miranda warnings before questioning by
prison officials, the trial court denied his motion to suppress the incriminating responses.
Id. Both the appellate court and the state supreme court affirmed the subsequent convic-
tion. Id. Justice Marshall dissented because the case provided "the Court a chance to
clarify what constitutes 'custody' for Miranda purposes in the prison setting." Id. at 326.
Perhaps the majority denied certiorari because it thought that Perkins had already
clarified the issue. According to the Perkins' majority, Miranda is only implicated in
situations where confessions are coerced and involuntary. If "the danger of coercion re-
sult[ing] from the interaction of custody and official interrogation" is absent, Miranda
warnings need not be given prior to custodial interrogation. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
See also supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
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nal prosecution: the Court gives the appearance of being not merely the
champion, but actually an arm of the prosecution.
In making the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights a part of our
fundamental law, the Framers recognized that limitless state power afflicts
the innocent as well as the guilty, even a crime-free world is not worth the
fear and oppression that inevitably follow unrestricted police power, and
that a truly free society is one in which every citizen-guilty or inno-
cent-is treated fairly and accorded dignity and respect by the State ...
Ours is the duty to prevent encroachment on these principles. . . . This
Court has, sadly, lost sight of this role, to the detriment of the rights of
each of us."3 8
The Perkins decision supports Justice Brennan's accusations.
CONCLUSION
The extent to which the Court feels comfortable in creating excep-
tions to the Miranda doctrine reflects its belief that Miranda extends
protection beyond the scope of the Constitution. Miranda attempted
to address concerns beyond deliberate physical police coercion. These
concerns addressed the psychological pressures inherent in incarcera-
tion, indirect police coercion, and adherence to an accusatory rather
than inquisitional criminal justice system. By focusing solely on di-
rect police coercion, the Perkins majority creates an exception that
ignores many of the concerns that motivated the Miranda decision.
Although the exception created by the Court does not overrule
Miranda, it represents a new approach to the recent Supreme Court
decisions which have all but eroded the Miranda doctrine. The
Court now shifts the focus of the "voluntariness" inquiry away from
police conduct. For the first time, the Court permits deliberate police
deception of an inmate in obtaining an unwarned confession. By fo-
cusing on the suspect's state of mind, the Court creates an exception
that blurs the bright-line rule which Miranda attempted to provide.
By labeling Miranda violations as mere "technicalities," the Court
diminishes the protection Miranda provides to secure Constitutional
rights. The Court has opened the door to abuse by encouraging the
use of police deception in custodial interrogations. The extent of the




138. 474 U.S. 1050, 1052-53 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes
118-21 and accompanying text.
